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Abstract
TWAIL is both a political and intellectual movement and, 
therefore, has multiple perspectives. While the first acade-
mic conference of TWAIL was held at Harvard Law School 
in March 1997, Third World perspectives of international 
law are part of a long tradition of critical internationalism. 
In this essay we will try to explain the meaning of the mo-
vement according to its most important scholars, and the 
TWAIL concern to the human rights discourse. It can be 
said that according TWAIL the historical model of human 
rights cannot respond to the needs of the Third World ex-
cept if there is a radical rethinking and restructuring of the 
international order, abandoning the efforts to universalize 
an essentially European corpus of human rights.
Keywords: TWAIL; Third World Approaches to Internatio-
nal Law; International Law; Third World; Human Rights.
Resumo
O “TWAIL” é tanto um movimento político, como intelectu-
al e, assim sendo, possui múltiplas perspectivas. Enquanto 
a primeira conferência acadêmica sobre TWAIL foi realiza-
da na Faculdade de Direito de Harvard em março de 1997, 
o tema faz parte de uma longa tradição do internaciona-
lismo crítico. Nesse artigo tentaremos explicar o significa-
do do movimento de acordo com seus mais importantes 
pensadores, bem como o TWAIL relativo ao discurso dos 
direitos humanos. Pode-se dizer que de acordo com o 
TWAIL o modelo histórico de direitos humanos é incapaz 
de responder às necessidades do Terceiro Mundo, exceto 
se houver uma reestruturação radical da ordem interna-
cional, abandonando-se os esforços para universalizar um 
corpo de direitos humanos essencialmente europeu.
Palavras-chave: TWAIL; Abordagens do Terceiro Mundo 
ao Direito Internacional; Direito Internacional; Terceiro 
Mundo; direitos humanos.
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS TWAIL?
This essay seems interesting because of the rapid increase in the number of 
books, articles, PhDs and papers written on TWAIL, which is evidence of it gaining pro-
minence, especially among those in the legal profession.
The “Third World Approaches to International Law” – TWAIL – can be concep-
tualized in many ways. It has already been defined as a scholarly community and/or a 
political movement; a methodology; a set of approaches; a chorus of voices; a theory; 
a network of scholars; a political grouping; a strategic engagement with international 
law; an intellectual community; a school of thought; a rubric; and in many other ways. 
For the purposes of this essay, it is more interesting to keep it as a movement, but both 
a political and intellectual movement. While the first academic conference of TWAIL 
was held at Harvard Law School in March 1997, Third World perspectives of interna-
tional law are much older. As a political movement, TWAIL dates back to the Bandung 
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference of 1955, which fostered the “Non-Aligned Movement” 
at the Belgrade Conference in 1961.
Therefore, the interests of Third World have been recently taken by international 
law, as before the decolonization and the political independence of Third World coun-
tries, they were ruled only by western powers national laws. After the Bandung Confe-
rence, Third World states try to organize a collective action and defend the starting of a 
New International Economic Order. In this context a group of frenchspeakers scholars 
tried to theorize the Third World contributions to international law seeking to change 
its contents. Nevertheless, such theories and even the concept of “third world” have 
been strongly delegitimized by mainstream scholars.1
Though, TWAIL is not new as a phenomenon, as TWAIL scholars have challen-
ged the existing international legal system for decades. Nevertheless, it is new as an 
intellectual movement which grew around the 1990s. The term TWAIL has embraced 
all scholarships that have advocated a postcolonial approach to international law inclu-
ding those associated with NAIL - New Approach to International Law, and many scho-
lars think that TWAIL have actually emerged from NAIL. According to Vikrant Dayanand 
Shetty, “the ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ does not refer to ‘after period of colonialism’ or ‘trium-
phing over colonialism’, but to the ‘continuation of colonialism in the consciousness of 
formerly colonized peoples, and in institutions imposed in the process of colonization’”.2 
1   GALLIÉ, Martin. Les théories tiers-mondistes du droit international (TWAIL). Un renouvellement? Revue Études internatio-
nales, vol. 39, n. 1, p. 17-38, mars 2008.
2   SHETTY, Vikrant Dayanand. Why TWAIL Must Not Fail: Origins and Applications of Third World Approaches to International Law. 
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The author reminds that at the heart of TWAIL is, however, unity in “opposition to the 
unjust global order.”3 Makau Mutua points out that immediately after World War II and 
after acquiring their political independence, the ex-colonies quickly realized that politi-
cal independence was largely illusory without economical independence.4 TWAIL also 
attack international legal order and its evolution, as they think force prevails over law. 
Thus, while Bhupinder Singh Chimni mentions the emergency of an “Imperial Global 
State” by the transfer of third world countries sovereignty towards international institu-
tions controlled by a transnational capitalist class, others prefer talking about a hege-
monic legal order, but at the end of the day international law remains an instrument to 
pursue the interests of ancient colonial powers.5
2. TWAIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Since the beginning of its discussions, TWAIL have always paid attention to the 
human rights discourse, which has been analyzed by both generations of TWAILers, 
TWAIL I and TWAIL II, if one accepts its division. This is so because there is some debate 
about the origins of TWAIL. While some scholars locate its origins at the end of the 20th 
century (TWAIL II), others will locate them at post-World War II (TWAIL I). As put by Ope-
oluwa Adetoro Badaru, TWAIL I scholarship, in the late 1960s and 1970s, was concerned 
by the call for the recognition of a right to development, and its approaches to inter-
national human rights law were largely state-centric. TWAIL II scholars, otherwise, are 
largely people-centric, as they aim at “identify and give voice to the marginalized people 
within Third World states - women, peasants, workers, minorities - who they believe had 
been generally excluded from consideration by TWAIL I scholarship.”6 According to him, 
“this emphasis on giving a voice to the peoples and critiquing human rights seems to 
be a primary focus of TWAIL II with regards to international human rights law”7. Another 
of the critiques by TWAIL II around the 1990s concerns the tendency of international 
human rights law to promote a sort of universal culture of human rights without ade-
quate Third World input. 
Thus, TWAIL scholars contend that a TWAIL perspective of international human 
rights law is crucial to identify many problems concerning the mainstream discourse. 
King’s Student Law Review, London, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 68-82, apr. 2012. p. 71.
3   Idem.  p. 76.
4   MAKAU, Mutua. What is TWAIL? American Society of International Law Proceedings, Washington, vol. 94, 31-38, 2000.
5   GALLIÉ, Martin. Les théories tiers-mondistes du droit international (TWAIL). Un renouvellement? Revue Études internationa-
les, vol. 39, n. 1, p. 17-38, mars 2008. p. 27.
6   BADARU, Opeoluwa Adetoro. Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for International Human 
Rights Law. International Community Law Review, London, vol. 10, n. 4, p. 379-387, 2008.
7   Idem. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to remind that diversity and heterogeneity is one 
of the characteristics of TWAIL. That is why scholars associated with TWAIL may diverge 
significantly regarding the method, the epistemology employed or the political appro-
ach. Concerning methodology, the “transdisciplinarity” though not a solely TWAIL ini-
tiative or methodology, as an analytical tool enables scholars to successfully employ 
this conceptual framework in their methodological inquiries into the current state of 
the TWAIL contributions8.
Bhupinder Singh Chimni reminds that the contradictions which mark contem-
porary international law is perhaps best manifested in the field of international human 
rights law which even as it legitimizes the internationalization of property rights and 
hegemonic interventions, codifies a range of civil, political, social, cultural and econo-
mic rights which can be invoked on behalf of the poor and the marginal groups.9
Rémi Bachand, at his turn, points out that the normative and political goals of 
TWAILers have guided them to question important issues regarding international law, 
and beside the focus on the historical evolution of their field, they have concentrated 
also on the critique of human rights.10 According to him, there are three types of criti-
ques which are addressed to human rights. The first one is centered on the relationship 
between universality and particularity, that is, TWAILers argue that the current ‘univer-
sal’ and ‘official’ human rights corpus is based essentially in European philosophy, al-
though the concept of human rights is not unique to European societies.11 Further, 
they attack the universalizing imaginary based on the premise that they are neutral, 
objective and apolitical, and the example is the emphasis on civil and political rights.12
The second critique addressed to human rights by TWAIL pointed out by Rémi 
Bachand is that they are a way to civilize peoples mired in a savage and barbaric cul-
ture (that is, the Third World) , and a way to impose European standards often used as 
a toll for colonialist or imperialist practices and interventions.13 Makau MUTUA’s works 
8   Idem. p. 381.
9   CHIMNI, B. S. Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto. International Community Law Review, London, 
vol. 8, n. 1, p. 3-27, 2006. p. 26.
10  BACHAND, Rémi. Critical Approaches and the Third World. Towards a Global and Radical Critique of International Law. Speech 
at University McGill, 24 mar. 2010.
11   Here, Rémi Bachand quotes the work of Bonny IBHAWOH, who tries to show that human rights were far from being non-exis-
tent in Africa before colonization, as well as their significant differences with the European model, which claims its universality. 
See Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in African History, 2007, p. 23. BACHAND, Rémi. Critical Appro-
aches and the Third World. Towards a Global and Radical Critique of International Law. Speech at University McGill, 24 
mar. 2010.
12   BACHAND, Rémi. Critical Approaches and the Third World. Towards a Global and Radical Critique of International Law. 
Speech at University McGill, 24 mar. 2010.
13   The author states: “In a similar way that some supposedly universal values have been used to conquer and colonize parts of 
the Third World from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, human rights (or concepts like good governance or development), 
are now used to impose European standards favoured by Westerners.” BACHAND, Rémi. Critical Approaches and the Third 
World. Towards a Global and Radical Critique of International Law. Speech at University McGill, 24 mar. 2010.
265Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 5, n. 1, p. 261-272, jan./abr. 2018.
TWAIL – “Third World Approaches to International Law” and human rights: some considerations
focus on that issue, talking about what he calls the “SVS metaphore” – savages, victims, 
saviors.14
Another important issue concerning this critique is the TWAILers’ epistemolo-
gical questioning about the politics of knowledge, that is, the origins of the knowled-
ge within international law, or the foundations of international law. According to An-
drew F. Sunter, it seems to be a naturalized epistemology, which seems to validate the 
knowledges a priori departing from a posteriori facts. TWAILers, instead, depart from a 
suspicious hermeneutics, trying to identify the very reasons of knowledge, and not its 
justifications.15
 The third critique addressed to human rights by TWAIL pointed out by Rémi 
Bachand concerns the imposition of a form of political organization and a form of sta-
te as such: the liberal state adopting representative democracy, as it can easily be de-
monstrated by the focus on civil and political rights, which seek to strengthen, legiti-
mize, and export political or liberal democracy. Makau Mutua states that the human 
rights “have become synonymous with the human rights movement”, and he argues 
also that liberalism does not tackle the causes of real and economic inequality, whi-
ch is the main challenge of Third World.16 Further, Rémi Bachand observes that TWAI-
Lers’ analysis remain less radical than their political militancy, even if some scholars are 
openly Marxists. The author reminds also that the European historical origins of human 
rights (the protection of emerging bourgeoisie against authoritarian monarchical re-
gimes) are enough to demonstrate that they are far from being adequate to protect 
Third World against violation of the same rights, that is, imperialist and neocolonialist 
practices. In other words, those human rights have not been made to fight against im-
perialism and neocolonialism. According to Rémi Bachand: “Nevertheless, the criticisms 
made by Twail, interpreted in the light of our own comments, reveal that a subalternist 
theory of international law can only take human rights as strategic tools, if not tactics 
from the struggle for emancipation, and that it would be a mistake to raise them to the 
level of the ultimate goal to be attained.”17 
14   MUTUA, Makau. Savages, Victims and Saviors. The Metaphor of Human Rights. Harvard International Law Journal, Cambri-
dge, vol. 42, n. 1 p. 201-245, 2001.
15   SUNTER, Andrew F. TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Cambridge, 
vol. 20, n. 2, p. 494-498, 2007.
16   MUTUA, Makau. The Ideology of Human Rights. Virginia Journal of International Law, Charlottesville, vol. 36, p. 589-658, 
1996. p. 636
17   BACHAND, Rémi. Les Third world approaches to international law: Perspectives pour une approche subalterniste du droit 
international. In: TOUFAYAN, Marc; TOURME-JOUANNET Emmanuelle; RUIZ FABRI, Hélène. Droit international et nouvelles 
approches sur le Tiers-monde: entre répétition et renouveau. Paris: Société de législation comparée, 2013. p. 395. In the ori-
ginal : “Quoi qu’il en soit, les critiques faites par les Twail, interprétées au regard de nos propres commentaires, nous laissent 
voir qu’une théorie subalterniste du droit international ne peut prendre les droits humains autrement que comme des outils 
stratégiques, sinon tactiques de la lutte pour l’émancipation, et que ce serait une erreur que de les hausser au rang d’objectif 
ultime à atteindre”.
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Opeoluwa Adetoro Badaru observes the following points where a TWAIL pers-
pective of international human rights law would help: (1) to “highlight the historical 
root causes of the current dismal state of socio-economic rights in the Third World, and 
thus not to approach human rights issues from a mainly formal textual and institutional 
angle”;18 (2) to recognize how international human rights law can be manipulated to 
promote and legitimise neo-liberal aspirations, “unveiling the discrepancy between the 
contradictory languages that international law adopts in its different subject streams, 
for example, supporting the promotion of human rights and at the same time disregar-
ding when the practice of international trade and economic law consistently violates 
human rights”;19 (3) “to understand the internationalization of human rights violations 
in the sense of how the activities in one part of the world can have detrimental effects 
in other parts of the world (the Third World especially), and hence, could equip scholars 
with more justifications for demanding extraterritorial obligations from richer states”20; 
(4) to demystify the assumption that human rights have been conceived in the West 
and hence should be promoted universally disregarding Third World particularities;21 
(5) in the same vein, it helps “to deconstruct the ideology of “savage-victim-savior” that 
has permeated international human rights law, and to criticize the human rights initia-
tive as a preservation of the essential structure of the “civilizing mission” of the North”.22
Regarding the internationalization of the discourse of human rights, Opeoluwa 
Adetoro Badaru adds that “one has to have a critical eye especially as it is obvious that 
human rights seem to come hand-in-hand with neo-liberal policies. A TWAIL perspec-
tive helps one to be conscious of the oppressive potential of universality, and to scruti-
nise which aspects of human rights may be made universal and which aspects need to 
be re-examined”.23
Makau Mutua observes that “the United Nations, formed after World War II by 
the dominant Western powers, aimed to create and maintain global order through pe-
ace, security, and cooperation among states”. And he observes that this new global or-
der had two important legitimating features. The first one, “non-European powers were 
now recognized as having the right to self-determination, which was a repudiation of 
direct colonialism”, the second, “states were to be governed by human rights”.24 Fur-
ther, he asserts that since 1945, the United Nations has played a key role in preserving 
18   BADARU, Opeoluwa Adetoro. Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for International Human 
Rights Law. International Community Law Review, London, vol. 10, n. 4, p. 379-387, 2008. p. 381.
19   Idem. Ibidem.
20   Idem. p. 383.
21   Idem. Ibidem.
22   Idem. Ibidem.
23   Idem. Ibidem.
24   MAKAU, Mutua. What is TWAIL? American Society of International Law Proceedings, Washington, vol. 94, 31-38, 2000. p. 34.
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the global order dominated by the West. A critically important agenda of the United 
Nations has been the universalization of European principles and norms, as the spre-
ad of human rights which grow out of Western liberalism and jurisprudence. The West 
was able to impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because it 
dominated the United Nations at its inception.  The fallacy of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which refers to itself as the “common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and all nations,” is now underscored by the identification of human rights 
norms with political democracy. The principal focus of human rights law has been on 
those rights that strengthen, legitimize, and export the liberal democratic state to non
-Western societies.25
Makau Mutua, in a very optimistic way, also notices that human rights corpus 
is slowly evolving from its paradigmatic Western orientation, and slowly stops been 
seen as a “gift of the West to the “rest” of the world”, towards the construction of a truly 
universal project. Thus, as initially there was great emphasis on civil and political rights, 
since the mid-1990s, however, more attention has been paid to “economic powerless-
ness and the effect of globalization on people”.26 In his words, “a truly legitimate human 
rights movement cannot be cabined by powerful states and elites. It must be material 
for battle in the hands of the powerless. This, however, will not be possible unless the 
movement is purged of its Eurocentric, racist, free-market biases”.27
Pooja Parmar, on the other hand, proposes that the starting point of research 
must be the everyday lives of Third World peoples and all its complexities, “in order 
to examine how the modern human rights discourse relates and responds, or as is the 
case more often, fails to respond to them.” Thus, he proposes the emergence of “the 
‘how’ questions”, as the following ones: (1) “How has the modern theory of internatio-
nal human rights been produced?”; (2) “How have historical processes, especially those 
associated with colonialism, enabled the delegitimation of certain knowledges and the 
privileging of others?”; (3) “How does this process continue to facilitate the marginalisa-
tion of the suffering of some humans?”; (4) “How might the ‘exhumation of subjugated 
knowledges’ in all their complexity lead to alternative theories of human rights?”28
In this vein, Pooja Parmar recognizes the immense potential of a TWAIL pers-
pective to theorizing alternative conceptions of human rights, mainly for the particular 
attention to histories that TWAIL brings to the study of international law. This historical 
approach would make it possible “to identify historical exclusions inherent in modern 
25   MUTUA, Makau. Savages, Victims and Saviors. The Metaphor of Human Rights. Harvard International Law Journal, Cambri-
dge, vol. 42, n. 1 p. 201-245, 2001. p. 215.
26   MUTUA, Makau. Change in the Human Rights Universe. Harv. Hum. Rts. J., Cambridge, vol. 20, p. 3-5, 2007. p. 3.
27   Idem. Ibidem.
28   PARMAR, Pooja. TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry. International Community Law Review, London, vol. 10, n. 4, p. 363-370, 
2008. p. 366.
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human rights discourse, as well as historical struggles against such exclusions.” Accor-
ding to him, histories of Third World peoples raise more ‘how’ questions like: (1) “how 
did the suffering of some humans, and certain types of suffering get pushed to the 
margins of human rights theory and practice?”; (2) “How have ‘people in struggle and 
communities of resistance’ challenged this marginalisation in the past, and how do they 
continue to do so in the present?”; (3) “How might these histories of (and in) the present 
challenge and alter our conceptions of human rights?”.29 In other words, “we are called 
upon to pay attention to how we uncritically embrace certain terms in European thou-
ght, and thereby reproduce and reiterate their meanings.”30
In a very forceful work, Makau Mutua contends that the human rights move-
ment is marked by a ‘damning’ metaphor, which “contains a subtext that depicts an 
epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the 
other. The savages-victims-saviors (SVS) construction is a three-dimension-al compou-
nd metaphor in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself.” 31 According to him, this 
metaphor has been constructed by the main authors of the human rights discourse, 
including the United Nations, Western states, international non-governmental organi-
zations, and senior Western academics, rendering the human rights corpus and its dis-
course “unidirectional and predictable, a black-and-white construction that pits good 
against evil”.32
Concerning the three dimensions of the metaphor, the first one depicts a sava-
ge and evokes images of barbarism, the second one depicts the face and the fact of a 
victim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood, and the third dimension is the 
savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and 
safeguards.33
The first dimension of the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of barba-
rism so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity. 
According to Makau Mutua, although savagery in human rights discourse connotes 
much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of sava-
gery: “the “good” state controls its savagery and internalizes human rights, as the “evil” 
state expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian cultu-
re. The only way for the state to be redeemed or saved is submitting on to human rights 
norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d’être 
29   Idem.  p. 367.
30   Idem.  p. 367-368.
31  MUTUA, Makau. Savages, Victims and Saviors. The Metaphor of Human Rights. Harvard International Law Journal, 
Cambridge, vol. 42, n. 1 p. 201-245, 2001. p. 201-202.
32   “The human rights project drive from the unflinching belief that human beings and the political societies they construct can 
be governed by a higher morality”. Idem. Ibidem.
33   Idem.
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of human rights law.”34 Notwithstanding, Makau Mutua warns that reality is far more 
complex, for:
it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state 
only becomes a vampire when ‘bad’ culture overcomes or disallows the development 
of ‘good’ culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from 
human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, 
military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as the 
one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation, not in the state per se.35
The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim – 
whose dignity has been violated by the savage - as well as the essence and the idea of 
victimhood. Thus, “the victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist 
attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the 
cultural foundation of the state.”36
The third dimension of the prism is “the savior or the redeemer, the good angel 
who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards”, whose promise is freedom 
from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture, and the freedom to create a bet-
ter society based on particular values. Actually, the savior is the human rights corpus 
itself, represented by the United Nations, Western governments, international non-go-
vernmental organizations, and Western charities and, ultimately the savior is “a set of 
culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.”37 
Makau Mutua highlights that the human rights corpus is fundamentally Euro-
centric, and hence suffers from several flaws captured in the SVS metaphor, like:
(1) First, the corpus falls within the historical context of the Eurocentric colonial 
project, in which actors are in hierarchical positions, undermining the basic claim of 
universality;38
(2) Second, “the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of 
cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal”, that is, “the metaphor is premised 
34   Idem. p. 202-203.
35   Idem. p. 203.
36   Idem. p. 204.
37   Idem. Ibidem.
38   Idem. p. 204-205. “Some of the most important events preceding the post-1945, United Nations-led human rights movement 
include the anti-slavery campaigns in both Africa and the United States, the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, and the struggles for women’s suffrage and equal rights throughout the world. But the pioneering work of many 
non-Western activists and other human rights heroes are not acknowledged by the contemporary human rights movement. 
These historically important struggles, together with the norms anchored in non-Western cultures and societies, have either 
been overlooked or rejected in the construction of the current understanding of human rights.”
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on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric 
prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic. The SVS metaphor results 
in an “othering” process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb 
copies of the original.” For example, Western political democracy is in effect an organic 
element of human rights, from which “savage” cultures and peoples are far, allowing the 
creation of victims.39
(3) Third, the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus are arrogant and 
biased, a grand narrative hidden in the seemingly neutral and universal, preventing 
the movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy and undermining the universalist 
warrant that it claims40.
(4) Fourth, there is an urgent need for a human rights movement that is multi-
cultural, inclusive, that overcomes Eurocentrism and that also “address the power rela-
tions among and within cultures, national economies, states, genders, religions, races 
and ethnic groups, and other societal cleavages.” In other words, Eurocentrism cannot 
be the starting point while other cultures are peripheral, otherwise, “the point of depar-
ture for the movement must be a basic assumption about the moral equivalency of all 
cultures.”41
(5) Fifth, the SVS metaphor of human rights is based on a global racial hierarchy, 
where savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, while the saviors 
are white. In the words of Mutua Makau, “there is also a sense in which human rights 
can be seen as a project for the redemption of the redeemers, in which whites who are 
privileged globally as a people - who have historically visited untold suffering and sa-
vage atrocities against non-whites - redeem themselves by “defending” and “civilizing” 
“lower”, “unfortunate”, and “inferior” peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pa-
thology of self-redemption42.”
Though, the idea of the universality of rights is noble, but the way the human 
rights movement is presented today “lies in their inadequacy, incompleteness, and 
wrong-headedness.43
3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Some TWAILers understand that there is a need to write the resistance of Third 
World peoples into international law. Nevertheless, attention has to be paid to the 
39   Idem. p. 205.
40   Idem.  p. 206.
41   Idem. p. 207.
42   Idem. p. 207-208.
43   Idem.  p. 209.
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interpretation of this resistance. In Pooja Parmar words, “a focus on strategies of resis-
tance adopted by people involved in struggles today reveals the centrality of the rights 
language, but it also reveals the limitations of human rights law. The language of rights 
has arrived in our times burdened with “ideological and historical baggage”.44 And, ac-
cording to him, if the TWAIL focus is at ‘how does a proposed human rights theory res-
pond to the suffering of particularly situated human beings?’ the possibilities are wor-
th pursuing, and they “must be followed in ways that lead to conceptualisations that 
enable emancipatory interpretations and not replication of the past and continuing 
epistemic violence.”45 On the other hand, Upendra Baxi highlights that “this constant 
endeavour to convert needs into rights, howsoever problematic, is the hallmark of con-
temporary human rights.”46
Though, it can be said that according TWAIL the historical model of human rights 
cannot respond to the needs of the Third World except if there is a radical rethinking 
and restructuring of the international order, abandoning the efforts to universalize an 
essentially European corpus of human rights. According There is a need of breaking the 
hierarchical relationships between European and non-European populations and of the 
multiculturalization of the corpus in some areas like balancing between individual and 
group rights, giving more substance to social and economic rights, relating rights to 
duties, and addressing the relationship between the corpus and economic systems.47
Since 1945, the United Nations has played a key role in universalizing principles 
and norms which are European in identity, whose “principal focus has been on those ri-
ghts that strengthen, legitimize, and export the liberal democratic state to non-Western 
societies.”48 In this vein, at the same time the human rights movement lacks in Third 
World legitimacy, it is aimed primarily at the Third World. Makau Mutua highlights that 
Europeans and North Americans share a common philosophical and legal ancestry, and 
so they can create a common political and cultural template to govern their societies. 
But they should not be allowed to insist that their particular vision of society is the only 
permissible civilization which must now be imposed on societies of the whole world. 
So, the merits of the European and American civilization of human rights and its missio-
nary work is suspect and might seem as part of the colonial project.49
44   PARMAR, Pooja. TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry. International Community Law Review, London, vol. 10, n. 4, p. 363-370, 
2008. p. 369.
45   Idem.  p. 368.
46   BAXI, Upendra. Too many or too few, human rights?. Human Rights Law Review, [s.l.], vol. 1, n. 1, p. 1-9, mar. 2001. p. 3.
47   MUTUA, Makau. Savages, Victims and Saviors. The Metaphor of Human Rights. Harvard International Law Journal, Cambri-
dge, vol. 42, n. 1 p. 201-245, 2001. p. 243.
48   Idem.  p. 215.
49   Idem. p. 216.
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